STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PETITIONS
Note: In this document
the RCB Group’s comments are in italics and coloured blue.
Today we
will be hearing from representatives from the Department of Defence to discuss
a petition which calls for the reclassification of the military service of
Rifle Company Butterworth between 1970 and 1989. I now invite representatives
from the Department of Defence to discuss the petition. I remind witnesses
that, although the committee does not require you to give evidence under oath,
this hearing is a legal proceeding of parliament and therefore has the same
standing as proceedings of the chambers themselves. The evidence given today
will be recorded by Hansard and will attract parliamentary privilege.
If you would
like to make a brief opening statement, we can then go straight to questions.
Mr Robert: Thanks Chair, and thank you for the
opportunity to come along as the responsible minister and to bring Colonel
Thompson, Director General of Military Strategic Commitments, and
Ms Cooper.
It was
interesting speaking to Colonel Thompson before; he actually spent three years
of his life - I think you said as a 'RAAF brat', Colonel -
Col. Thompson: I did.
Mr Robert: on RAAF Base Butterworth in the
1970s. It is good that we can bring someone along who is not only a military
professional but who can also can speak firsthand on what it was like there at
the time, with mum and dad, at Butterworth.
It is unfortunate that the
Minister would claim that a senior Army officer, a Colonel, who was a child at
the time he says he lived in the area, could provide ‘firsthand’ competent
commentary from any experience on military operations for the period under
review. At best, he might have some
theoretical knowledge; unless he was there as an adult Serviceman, AND has
studied the full range of now de-classified data and intelligence – he has done
neither - it is impossible for him to be proffered as an “expert” witness by
the Minister. This is evident in some of the Colonel’s later comments.
I would like
to make an opening statement. I thank the committee for its interest in the
matter of the nature of service classification for Army's Rifle Company
Butterworth, and for the opportunity to address you.
On 3 March, the committee referred to me a
petition seeking reclassification of the service of Rifle Company Butterworth
between 1970 and 1989. The petition contends that because those troops were
deployed to provide a protective and quick reaction force, this service should
be reclassified from 'peacetime' to 'warlike'.
In preparing
a response to the petition, a senior research officer with no prior involvement
in earlier Defence reviews of Rifle Company Butterworth's service has reviewed
and extended prior research.
Comment 2. We question the objectivity and competence of the Senior
Research Officer. We have sourced a wide range of primary source documents that
show the real nature of affairs on the ground at Butterworth. Not only have
many of these been ignored by this Research Officer, we believe we have
demonstrated where the Researcher has actually ignored context to present a
picture that differs from that revealed in those source documents. This
approach reflects either significant research incompetence, or directed actions
to achieve an official position that is not supported by all the facts. The
Petition Group on the other hand, has several skilled researchers who have
identified and presented irrefutable evidence from the same literature
available to the Government’s Team, which has been shown to ignore or try to
“outmanoeuvre” the petitioners, a disastrous state of affairs given the
availability of the hard evidence.
The research
undertaken has been considerable and it has been thorough, including
re-examining all available official documentation held at the War Memorial and
the National Archives of Australia, encompassing opened, closed and not-yet-examined
documents. Defence records were also examined, including RAAF Base Butterworth
commanding officer reports, RAAF unit history records, and commanders' diaries
for those Australian battalions which provided an infantry Rifle Company for rotation
through Butterworth.
Comment 3. We question why the researcher been unable to locate high
level documents, both in terms of security classification and origin, which
reveal the training role was used to hide the real reason for the RCB
deployment. For example, the letter of the Secretary of the Department of
Defence of 2 March 1972 in which he states:
“In addition, Malaysian
reluctance having been overcome, the ANZUK force will now provide on infantry
company on rotation through Butterworth on a full-time basis, ostensibly for
training, flag-showing and a change of scene. The presence of this company will
provide the Commander with a ready-reaction force which he can use inter alia
to supplement the elements available to him under the joint Malaysia-RAAF Plan,
but short of an actual overt breach of security the Commander cannot use these
troops for guard or other security duties.”
We have a significant
range of documents from these same sources showing Communist Terrorists (CTs)
were active close to the Butterworth Air Base, that military authorities had
real concerns over the possibility of mortar and rocket attacks, and that
security levels were increased from time-to-time in response to possible ground
threats. All were sourced from National Archives/AWM. The NOSB researchers have
either NOT looked at some of them, or they have engaged in deliberate
deception, thereby placing the Minister in a most embarrassing position. These
documents are now readily accessible; some have already featured in our submissions
and been ignored.
This
research sought to define roles and responsibilities of the infantry rifle
company which rotated through Royal Australian Air Force Base Butterworth, and
the environment in which members of the Australian Defence Force served,
including the level of exposure to the risk of harm.
By way of
background, approximately 9,000 Australian Defence Force personnel served on
infantry rifle company rotations between 1970 and 1989. It is estimated that up
to 19,000 members of the Royal Australian Air Force also served at Butterworth
during the same period. In addition, there were Australian public servants and
teachers working at or near the base. For RAAF personnel, these were
accompanied postings, with families living in married quarters located outside
the base perimeter fence in the nearby area and on Penang. There were no
restrictions placed on movement by car, taxi or bus in the Butterworth area, or
on travel via ferry to Penang Island.
Comment 4. During both the 1948-1960 Emergency and the Indonesian
Confrontation Australian military members were accompanied by their families to
Peninsular Malaya/Malaysia. A draft document from 1975 sourced by veterans
reveals not only concerns for the safety of families but also shows concern
that if families were withdrawn it could give the CTs a psychological advantage
and damage Australia’s prestige in S.E. Asia.
In September 1975 a curfew
was imposed on three districts of Butterworth and in 1971 travel restrictions
existed in the Kulim area, approximately 15 miles from the Base.
As the Malaysian
Government gained the ascendency in the 1948-1960 Emergency ‘white areas’ were increasingly declared
commencing in 1953. Emergency restrictions were lifted in these areas. The area
around Butterworth was declared white in 1954, however during the Second
Malaysian Emergency, the same threat of CTs attack existed. Specific operations plans including
protection and evacuation of civilian dependants were in place.
During the
Vietnam conflict, which ended in 1972, Penang was a formal rest and
recuperation leave centre.
Comment 5. We contend that this is completely irrelevant.
Vung Tau and Saigon were
likewise rest and recreation areas during the Vietnam War yet both were inside
the war zone. Similarly, Penang has been described as a popular recreational
area from at least 1955 during the Emergency, with servicemen either driving or
travelling by rail from Kuala Lumpur as well. The evidence shows similar
conditions existed in the Butterworth area during the Second Malaysian
Emergency as in earlier ‘active service’ periods. Just as London and Berlin
were R & R centres during World War II.
While
Australian forces remained in Malaysia following the confrontation ceasefire on
11 August 1966, no state of war or emergency existed and, accordingly, the
Malaysian government made no further requests for assistance in security
operations.
Comment 6. We refute this totally.
Multiple sources exist
showing the Second Malaysian Emergency occurred. We have hard military and government
evidence from Australia and Malaysia, academic papers and newspaper articles
that show this.
The
Australian presence at Butterworth was a response to Malaysian and Singaporean
concerns regarding their vulnerability to acts of external aggression.
The Mirage
squadrons were the backbone of an integrated air defence system for both
nations. These forces incurred danger from armed communist forces and, because of concerns regarding the
ability of the Malaysian forces to provide adequate security, an Australian
Rifle Company was rotated through Butterworth to provide a specialist ground
defence role.
This all
occurred during what the Malaysian Government itself formally called an
emergency and published an entire book about, listing all of their campaigns,
casualty figures, and maps.
The RCB’s
role as an armed force capable of fighting to protect the RAAF assets was a
subterfuge revealed by the “training” cover up role directed in Defence
Committee Minute 2 dated 11 Jan 73, a vital document now available to all. This
is repeated down both the RAAF and Army chains of command in official documents
to prove it.
Therefore,
there were no allotments of Australian forces for special duty in Malaysia
after 14 September 1966, and Australian forces were not engaged in any
operations against hostile forces or dissident elements.
Comment 7. We contend that this
is a cover-up as well as an erroneous statement.
A declaration of a special
duty area would have meant those serving at Butterworth prior to the
introduction of Australian awards in 1975 would have become eligible for the
1962 General Service Medal for service in minor conflicts. This would have
exposed the real reason for the deployment.
Allotment for special duty
is a non-concept. The hard evidence is that the troops were deployed on DP1
(war ready) status, under Army Mounting Instructions that repeated the
‘training lie’.
The practical instructions
regarding tasks and the operational command relationships between Army and
RAAF, while the Rifle Company was at Butterworth were prescribed – these were
clearly active service. We have an audit trail of Army and RAAF documents that
show this. An example, even though it perpetuates the 1973 Defence Committee
order to lie about the operational deployment by officially stating it to be
one for “training purposes” is the Army Field Force Command Mounting
Instruction 2/79. Every RCB deployment
did so under such a Mounting Instruction.
Ownership of
the Butterworth Air Base was transferred to the Malaysian government on 31
March 1970. Until 1970, security at Butterworth was provided by the Royal Air
Force, but responsibility transferred to the Malaysian authorities with the
transfer of ownership.
The program
for rotating an infantry rifle company to Butterworth was implemented on 15
November 1970 by the Australian, New Zealand and British battalions from the
28th Commonwealth Brigade, which was located in Singapore. Interestingly, New
Zealand also deployed a company on rotation from 1971 to 1973.
With the
withdrawal of the Australian battalion from Singapore in September 1973, a
company group was provided from the Australian base battalion, deploying on
three-month rotations. It was around January 1980 that the infantry rifle
company located at Butterworth on rotation assumed the title of 'Australian
Army Rifle Company Butterworth', or RCB.
Comment 8. We agree with this general record but it does not tell the
full story.
History shows the
deployment of an ANZUK Rifle Company to Butterworth did not initially provide a
permanent presence. In 1971 the ANZUK Intelligence Group discussed the
increased communist activity in the Butterworth area and the communist
capability concluding that there was a ‘definite risk’ of small scale,
isolated attack against the Base at any time and without warning.
Unsurprisingly, this
occurred due to the increase in CT activity that led to the ramping up of
counter-insurgency operations (the reason for the start of the Second Malaysian
Emergency (SME)) and the greatly increased risk to the Butterworth Air Base. So
much so that the Australian government was forced to make a key and secret
decision, especially with the withdrawal of the battalion group and supporting
gun battery from Singapore. There is now a large amount of evidence to this effect
in RAAF intelligence material and it may not be denied.
Government awareness of
this heightened state of risk to the RAAF assets in Butterworth was evidenced by a letter from the Secretary,
Department of Defence, Sir Arthur Tange, to the Secretary, Department of Air,
dated 2 March 1972 which confirmed that, in response to the significantly
increased potential level of threat assessment, and the ‘Malaysian reluctance
having been overcome, the ANZUK force will now provide one infantry company on
rotation through Butterworth on a full-time basis …’, the action so quoted was
put into effect.
The RCB was duly deployed
direct from Australia, as a combat force to work under command of the RAAF
Commander for defence of RAAF assets inside the perimeter, as well as local
protection of dependents in an emergency. This occurred continuously for the
entire remainder of the SME, with the RCB armed in a manner and subject to
Rules Of Engagement (ROE) that can only occur in warlike conditions. Defence
Committee Minute 2 dated 11 Jan 73 provided the supreme “head of power” for
this to occur.
The date of the naming of
the company is irrelevant.
The roles of
the infantry rifle company were to provide a ground force presence in Malaysia;
to conduct training; and, as claimed in the petition, to assist in the security
of Butterworth, if required, and to provide a quick reaction force, if
required.
Comment 9. We contend that
Defence failed to even acknowledge, and therefore address, high level documents
showing the real reason for the deployment.
For example, the letter
from the Secretary, Department of Defence, cited above. ‘…the ANZUK force will
now provide one infantry company on rotation through Butterworth ostensibly for
training, flag-showing and a change of scene. The presence of this company will
provide the Commander with a ready-reaction force which he can use inter alia
to supplement the elements available to him under the joint Malaysia-RAAF Plan,
but short of an actual overt breach of security the Commander cannot use these
troops for guard or other security duties.’
Then there is the Defence
Committee Minute of 11 Jan 73: ‘…when the Australian battalion is withdrawn, the requirement for a
company for security duties at Butterworth will be met by providing the unit on
rotation from Australia. This could be presented publicly as being for training
purposes.’ This, we further contend, is the official pre-emptory cover up for
the real reason for RCB’s deployment, and the means to keep it covered up.
Other evidence also available to Defence, we believe, supports our
contention. Further, we contend, emphasising ‘ground force presence’ and
‘training’ in lower order documents cited by Defence was part of the way in
which the real purpose was hidden. All lower order documents repeat this “lie”,
however, the then-SECRET Defence Committee minute and supporting intelligence
prove that RCB was in fact deployed on operational duty.
However,
importantly the infantry rifle company was not to be involved in local civil
disturbances or to be employed in operations outside the perimeter of the air
base.
Comment 10. We agree with this simplistic statement;
however, it again fails to tell the full story.
The purpose of the
Australian presence at Butterworth during the SME was to provide a deterrent to
both internal and external aggression. The correspondence of Sir Arthur Tange,
cited above, shows Australia had real concerns over the ability of the
Malaysians to provide adequate protection, stating that this exposed the RAAF
to a ‘higher degree of risk’ than would be the case if the Base were under
Australian control.
Faced with the ‘objective
danger’ faced by Australian personnel and assets, an infantry company was
deployed to Butterworth to provide security of RAAF assets at a level acceptable
to Australia.
RCBs actually trained for this task before they were deployed as
directed in formal Army Directives (all available on file), but only to be
carried out ON the base, unless ordered to go outside the perimeter by the RAAF
commander. The latter possibility appears in the (now- declassified) “Air
Directives” file which contain RAAF Directives to that officer.
OC RAAF was ordered not to deploy RCB outside,
but he also had a written directive that in an operational emergency, he could
seek clearance to do so; one document authorises him to act alone if necessary.
The
Malaysian armed forces were responsible for the security of the base, and RAAF
personnel had primary responsibility for internal base security.
Comment 11. We concur with this
statement; it was part of a shared defence arrangement with the RAAF Commander
documents reflecting his duties and obligations, including having RCB under
operational control.
The Base was Malaysian
property and they controlled the perimeter and area outside the wire. However,
the Australian military personnel employed on security duties, including the
RCB, were responsible for the protection of shared assets and those points
considered vital to the operations of
both nations, including the shared Integrated Air Defence System, inside the wire. This meant Australian
forces were protecting and defending Malaysian as well as RAAF property from
attacks by Malaysia’s armed CT enemy. This was a constant focus for both sides
to avoid the potential for a clash of friendly forces, exacerbated by the fact
that both had live ammunition and ROEs, made more difficult by the fact that
the Malaysians were clearly engaged in combat operations from the base for much
of the time.
The infantry
rifle company provided a quick reaction force, normally a section size of 10
diggers, outside of normal weekday working hours—1800 hours at night through to
0600 hours.
Comment 12. We can prove that this
is an understatement and is written to make the operation sound like peacetime
garrison duty.
This was the minimum
requirement; depending on the time and potential threat.
The QRF was sometimes
three times that size, armed with machine guns and full complement of live
ammunition, around the clock and not “overnight”.
Some RCBs were also
required by the RAAF commander, depending on the threat level at the time, to
require the RCB commander OR his second in command to be on the base AS WELL in
case of attack.
Evidence in our possession
also shows that the RCB was at times assigned other security roles, such as
piquet duty and standing patrols as considered necessary at the time.
RAAF
property and assets were not guarded during normal working hours when they were
under surveillance of air force personnel working on the flight line or
elsewhere on the air base.
Comment 13. We contend that while
this statement is basically true it again fails to tell the real story.
The presence of RAAF
members on flight lines and other places in normal working hours would, by
itself, be a deterrent of sorts to subversive activities.
Many RCBs were required to
patrol the base in daylight as well as after hours in combat order (meaning
ready to fight), and conduct counter-penetration and counter attack rehearsals
as well as other combat defensive tasks. Photographic evidence confirms this to
be the case with daily training and other activities carried out by the rifle
company carrying weapons in daylight hours providing additional deterrence.
We contend that one of the
major reasons why the base was not overtly attacked was in large part because
of the overt size and regular exposure of heavily armed Australian soldiers who
could, and did, appear very quickly at any point inside the airfield, ready to
fight.
The rules of
engagement and the orders for opening fire for the infantry rifle company,
which also applied to all RAAF personnel, were defensive in nature and were to
be applied within the air base only.
Comment 14. We argue that the
writer of this statement does not understand the fundamentals of military
operations.
Rules of engagement
authorise the conditions under which lethal force can be used by a military
force. Their application, all documented in detail and not contested for RCB,
can only mean one thing - there was an ‘objective danger’ faced by those at
Butterworth who were authorised under certain conditions to use that lethal
force.
And the mounting
authorities knew that. Defence is an integral part of military conflict (also
known as a phase of war in all military doctrine). Personnel armed with weapons
and live ammunition, including while outside the base on exercises (documents
actually list the threat there as both wild animals and armed belligerents
(CTS)) will, if called upon to do defend themselves or others, be exposed to as
high a risk of harm as any other in a field of conflict when applying their
rules of engagement.
In the event
of a security emergency being declared, the infantry rifle company was to
assist with the protection of facilities, personnel and families under the
direction of the officer in command in the air base.
Comment 15. We contend that the
necessity to provide an infantry company to assist in this way supports our
view that military authorities considered it likely that an attack could take
place. As Justice Clarke said in 2003, if authorities believe a place is
vulnerable to attack and send forces to that place, they are placing those
forces in harm’s way. This was not normal peacetime service as Defence
maintain; the RCB was placed under the operational control of the RAAF
commander. That is a war-fighting relationship, not a training activity.
The ground
defence operations centre was established to manage all emergencies at the air
base, including security related emergencies. While this operation centre was
manned on a regular basis, such as during air defence exercises, simulations of
a declared emergency and during the movement of highly flammable material as a
precaution in response to local disturbance or potential threat, no security
emergency was ever declared at RAAF Base Butterworth.
Comment 16. We contend that this
is statement is a clear attempt to mislead and challenge its veracity.
We have pages of documents
that show increased security levels were implemented when considered necessary because
of the expectation of attack and that the GDOC was often activated to be able
to direct operations should such be necessary to defend the base.
The long-established
principle in Australian legislation regarding veterans’ entitlements is that it
is the expectation at the time that determines entitlements, not what history
determines retrospectively.
Defence rely on
retrospective assessments to deny proper entitlements. Even then, as is the
case here, the assertion that there was no security emergency declared
(whatever that means) is palpably false; hard evidence lists shows that the
GDOC was activated for real threats.
No attempt
has been made by Defence to conceal the fact that there was a level of threat
to RAAF Base Butterworth, but the level of threat was assessed as low.
Comment 17. We reject this effort
to mislead.
In fact, we have multiple
official military security assessments that say otherwise.
The Defence Committee
Minute No 2 dated 11 Jan 73 accepts there was sufficient threat to necessitate
a reinforced rifle company, which can defend against three times its size. RCB
carried its full war establishment of heavy weapons and was provided with
on-base live ammunition for them. This was a very powerful deterrent to the
CTs, and also a force that could be used elsewhere if needed under the Five
Power Defence Agreement.
As Justice Clarke said in
2003, attempts to add further descriptors to ‘danger’ have only resulted in
inconsistencies in service recognition. All that is required is ‘that injury
from hostile action was conceivable and might reasonably have been regarded as
an existing risk …’
Injury from the action of
the enemy was both conceivable and a reasonable expectation at the time. Claims
of ‘low risk’ appear to be designed to mislead by implying only high risk
deployments should receive active, or war-like recognition. There are several
other groups who faced a lesser threat that have received recognition eg Ubon,
East Timor.
To give you
some credence, the level of threat in Iraq for combat operations now is
assessed as high.
Comment 18. We have never
contended that the threat at Butterworth was at the same level as that in
places such Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam.
We do contend that the
threat at Butterworth was at least equivalent to that which applied across the
Malaysian Peninsular during the Emergency (1948-60), higher than that faced by
naval personnel in ships off the Malayan coast at any time, and similar to that at Ubon in the late 1960s.
As stated by CIDA
(Committee of Inquiry into Defence
Awards, 1994), Principle 3: ‘To maintain the inherent fairness and integrity of the Australian
system of honours and awards care must be taken that, in recognising service by
some, the comparable service of others is not overlooked or degraded’.
Rather than make unfair comparisons to places such as Iraq as
Defence does, we request that comparison be made to other places comparable to
that existing at Butterworth during the SME.
Defence has
acknowledged that there were instances of elevated concern over possible
threats to the base from communist terrorists, as they were known at the time,
and local racial disturbances that gave cause to the GDOC, which is the Ground
Defence Operations Centre, to be manned at times and for security practices to
be changed. However, the daily routine of the air base continued unabated
throughout the period.
Comment 19. We contend that this
statement is misleading and dismisses statements to the contrary in documents
cited by Defence.
CO Base Squadron
Butterworth’s monthly reports from the beginning of 1976 to Sept 1978 clearly
show the GDOC was activated regularly to cover possible ground threats. These
activations are shown under the heading ‘Operational’ whereas training
activities are under the heading ‘Training’.
Further, documents also
available to Defence but ignored by them show that at least one stage aircraft
were dispersed to different points around the Base as a safeguard against
possible rocket or mortar attacks, tightened control of access and search of
civilian vehicles were in place, there was increased patrolling and the
dispatch of an additional nine RAAF Police from Australia occurred to assist
with security duties. This was not a continuation of normal routine. Many
veterans have provided consistent statements that reflect the variation in the
nature and level of RCB security activity.
Reference to a ‘period of
tension’ in one of these documents further supports our claim that this was not
normal peacetime service. The fact that “business as usual” was achieved for
most of the time is due to the deterrent success of the RCB’s presence.
Whilst
communist terrorists were active at various times and in various parts of the
Malaysian Peninsula, life continued as normal for the local population, as well
as those posted to Butterworth and their families who lived outside the wire.
Comment 20. We assert that this is
a “so what?” question and irrelevant statement. Nor is it correct.
There were documented
threats such as attacks recorded in the intelligence summaries including on
Penang, and plans existed for the protection of dependents, none of whom lived
inside the airfield wire. Veterans’ statements also record periodic incidents
that indicate there were threats off-base as well as to the base itself.
Further, Noel Barber’s
‘The War of the Running Dogs’, a history of the Malayan Emergency (1948-60),
shows that the Communists recognised early in that war the futility of
terrorising the civilian population and destroying the infrastructure they
relied on for their income. Subsequently they restricted their attacks to
security forces and security force installations. “White areas” were introduced to Malaya in
1953 with all restrictions in those areas lifted. As control was achieved
across Malaya to the extent that more areas could be so designated, life
returned to normal for most of the Malaysian population.
In a departure from the
doctrine followed by Chin Peng in the (first) Emergency, during the Second
Malaysian Emergency the CTs embarked on urban terrorism, targeting security
force personnel. The Malaysian Government’s official publication The Malaysian Army’s Battle Against
Communist Insurgency in Peninsular Malaysia 1968 – 1989 provides a good
coverage of the CT operations and the Malaysians massive expansion of their
Armed Forces to deal with it, including where, and how, and the 1000+
casualties incurred during that campaign. Note the title: Army Battle … That is war. And it included
Butterworth as a prime base of operations.
Subsequent restrictions,
such as curfews and road blocks in the Butterworth area during the 1970s, would
not have been seen in the area since 1954.
Instances of
the perimeter fence being cut were not attributed at the time to communist
terrorists, but considered to be done for the purpose of petty theft.
Comment 21. We assert that this
statement merely seeks to denigrate and undermine our claim. The fact that the
fence was found cut at times and evidence of unauthorised entry only helps
highlight the vulnerability of the Base to penetration by one or more
insurgents with ill-intent. Whether it may have been petty criminals or not is
academic.
There was never an attack on RAAF Base
Butterworth by communist terrorists.
Comment 22. We contend that a long
standing legal principle precludes retrospective assessment. Justice Mohr in
2000 said in effect that if a veteran incurs danger from the hostile forces of
an enemy he or she is entitled to repatriation benefits – or what is now called
war-like service recognition. Mohr further stated that this test it met when
veterans face an ‘objective danger.’
We contend that the
evidence we have proves Butterworth veterans faced an objective danger, both by
the fact of proven communist activities in the near vicinity of the base and
the warnings given to service personnel.
Deterrence is a great way
to succeed in operational deployment where the best battle fought is one where
the enemy’s centre of gravity is circumvented so that he is defeated without a
shot fired. If the presence of the RCB at Butterworth deterred communist
attacks then its presence actively aided the Malaysian security forces by
enabling them to continue their operations from Butterworth unabated. Ubon, for
example, was recognised as being ‘warlike’ service but Mohr found there was no
record of any attack.
While the
period of 1966 to 1989 has been referred to as the second emergency, this title
appears to be have been applied retrospectively—there is no historical record
of the Malaysian government ever declaring a second emergency.
Comment 23. We contend that this
is an astonishing failure to accept publically available historical records and
publications.
Aside from the official
Malaysian government publication already quoted, and another in Defence libraries,
the expression ‘new emergency’ appears in a range of publications including an
article in The Straits Times dated 4 Sep 75 attributed to the Malaysian Prime
Minister Tun Razak.
The 1977 Summer edition of
the journal ‘Pacific Affairs’ published an article by Richard Stubbs
‘Peninsular Malaysia: the “New Emergency”’. This is readily accessible on the
internet. A nation-wide emergency was declared in 1969 following race riots and
emergency regulations toughened in 1975. Several academic theses and papers
examine and document the second emergency.
Submissions
seeking review of a nature of service classification of past service are
considered in the context of the legislation and policies that applied at the
time of the service under review. The applicable legislation was for the period
of RCB service, 1970 to 1989, was the Repatriation (Special Overseas Service)
Act 1962.
Comment 24. We contend that forces
at Butterworth incurred danger from the hostile forces of an enemy, namely the
military and underground operatives of the Malayan Communist Party and their
sympathisers.
If, as Defence maintain,
review of past service is considered against the legislation and policies at
the time, why did Clarke in 2003 apply warlike and non-warlike criteria when
reviewing service that was rendered against former legislation?
Special
overseas service, which is equivalent to the contemporary classification of
warlike service, required that personnel be allocated for special duty within a
declared special area.
Comment 25. We contend that this
is singling out RCB veterans unfairly.
Justice Mohr, in 2000,
considered it unfair that veterans should be denied proper recognition of
service because the right procedures for their deployment to a particular area
were not followed by their commanders at the time – that is, the allocation to
a declared area for special duty.
Special duty
was defined under that legislation as ‘duty relating directly to the warlike
operations or state of disturbance by reason of which the declaration in
respect of the specific or the special areas was made’.
Comment 26. We contend that this is singling out RCB veterans unfairly.
Justice Mohr, in 2000,
considered it unfair that veterans should be denied proper recognition of
service because the right procedures for their deployment to a particular area
were not followed by their commanders at the time – that is, the allocation to
a declared area for special duty.
Because no
state of war or emergency existed in Malaysia after the end of confrontation on
11 August 1966 and because the Malaysian government made no request to the
Australian government for military assistance after this date, ADF personnel
were not engaged in duty relating to warlike operations or a state of
disturbance in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989.
Comment 27. We contend that this is not correct.
The RAAF presence at
Butterworth was to provide an Integrated Air Defence System for Malaysia and
Singapore because of their perceived vulnerability to external aggression. We
would not have been there if we were not invited.
During the SME, there was
a clearly defined threat to the base from which Malaysian forces were launching
operations against the enemy. ADF
personnel, including and especially RCB, were clearly engaged in warlike
operations defending RAAF/shared assets at Butterworth, a state of affairs that
had to have been accepted by the politicians of both countries of the day,
otherwise the Australian Defence Committee Minute 2/73 would never have been
put into effect. Reading that full document is most illuminating in that it
also outlines the political rationale for deploying RCB to Butterworth.
Evidence presented
elsewhere in this document clearly proves a state of undeclared war existed in
Malaysia at the time.
As a result,
ADF service, including those at Butterworth, cannot be considered to be the
special service under this act at the time, the Repatriation (Special Overseas
Service) Act 1962.
Comment 28. We contend, given the
fact of previous reclassifications of service against current criteria that
this statement by Defence is meant to mislead.
Therefore,
instead of seeking reclassification of their service under the Special Overseas
Service Act, Butterworth claimants are seeking a warlike classification under
the current framework, which was incorporated into the Veterans' Entitlements
Act 1986, and they were seeking this in 1997.
Comment 29. We proffer the fact
that Justice Clarke used the warlike criteria when assessing service conditions
going back to the early 1950s.
Warlike
operations under this current framework, since 1997, are defined as 'those
military activities where the application of force is authorised to pursue
specific military objectives and there is an expectation of casualties'.
These
operations can encompass, but are not limited to, a state of declared war,
conventional combat operations against an armed adversary, and peace
enforcement operations, which are military operations in support of diplomatic
efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to
intervention and may be engaged in combat and activities.
Comment 30. We welcome the use of
the correct criteria for warlike service in this instance and question why it
was not used in the Nature of Service Branch report to the Committee, dated 28
April 2014?
At paragraph 122 NOSB stated: ‘Warlike operations are
those military activities where the application of force is authorised to
pursue specific military objectives and (the degree of exposure to the risk of
harm is such that) there is an expectation of casualties. Warlike operations
include a state of declared war, conventional combat operations against an
armed adversary and peace enforcement operations.’ Was this another attempt to
mislead?
No ADF
service at Butterworth through the period 1970-1989 including those of Butterworth
meets any of these criteria.
Comment 31. We challenge this
claim by Defence; the evidence we have presented demonstrates conclusively that
the RCB meet all of these criteria as is argued throughout this document. See
further material below.
If necessary, the matter
may need independent analysis as clearly the Government depends on flawed
advice from its advisors.
The
Butterworth—or the RCB, the Rifle Company Butterworth—were not pursuing any
specific military objectives, were not authorised to use force beyond the
minimum required for self-defence and there was definitely no expectation of
any casualties.
Comment 32. We contend that this
is incorrect.
Australia provided two Mirage squadrons to Butterworth under the
Five Power Defence Arrangement as the major contributor to an Integrated Air
Defence System for Malaysia and Singapore. This became operative on 1 September
1971.
The air defence of these
nations was a military objective.
In order to achieve this
objective it was necessary to defend Australian assets at Butterworth from the
objective danger presented by the presence of communist insurgents. This
objective was achieved, following the withdrawal of the Australian Battalion
from Singapore in 1973, by the rotation of an Australian Rifle Company from
Australia (RCB) for security duties,
sold publicly as for training purposes owing to the political sensitivities of
the time.
We contend that rules of
engagement extended well ‘beyond the minimum required for self-defence’. NOSB
acknowledged in their April 2014 document that the ROE were for ‘the protection
of facilities, personnel and families under the direction of the OC RAAF
Butterworth.’ One does not use live ammunition to apply ROE in
training/peacetime.
Regarding casualties, the
expectation of possible rocket and mortar attack, ‘sabotage by the planting of
delayed-action explosives, booby-traps and other similar devices designed to …
injure personnel …’ must, by nature, be accompanied by an expectation of
casualties. Casualties were expected through the scaling of two medics per RCB
with access to a RAAF hospital and rotor medevac. RCB troops were fully trained
in battlefield casualty emergency first aid.
Throughout the 68-89 SME,
Malaysian security forces suffered 1009 casualties, 155 killed and 854 wounded.
RCB suffered several Fatal Non-Battle Casualties and numerous injured as a
result of being deployed.
We contend it is illogical
to state ‘there was definitely no expectation of any casualties’ and certainly
most disrespectful to the actual casualties on all sides.
Importantly,
at no time throughout the period 1970 to 1989 did any Australian government
consider it necessary or appropriate to reconsider or reclassify the Rifle
Company Butterworth or any ADF service at Butterworth. As advised earlier,
28,000 ADF personnel or there about served at Butterworth during the period.
Comment 33. We contend that it was
not possible when the rifle company was initially deployed from Australia to
comply with the policies and procedures surrounding deployment at the time
owing to the political sensitivities and secret nature of the deployment.
The history of previous
reviews of military service shows that the Australian Government and Military
hierarchy have not always ‘done the right thing’ for the troops.
This, we believe, is
another example, and it needs to be corrected rather than used as a cynical
excuse for failure to act decently now.
Mentioning the larger
number of ADF personnel is not relevant to the specific RCB case, if anything,
it underscores the Government’s real concern, the potential size of other
groups who might have a similar claim that it wishes to prevent by denying the
concrete case placed by RCB group.
Since 2006,
Defence has provided responses to 40 submissions from 17 claimants seeking
reclassification of this service from 1970 to 1989 and one claimant for the
reclassification of other ADF services at RMAF Base Butterworth. Many of these
claims have been form letters generated by simply one or two individuals.
There is no
evidence to suggest that the views of the 17 individual claimants seeking
reclassification of Butterworth service are supported by the majority of the
estimated 28,000 personnel who served at Butterworth between 1970 and 1989.
Comment 34. We contend that the Australian
Government has a moral and legal obligation to its veterans irrespective of the
number and nature of submissions.
This means correcting
anomalies if and when they become apparent. This obligation should not rest on
the number of veterans from a particular time and place ‘making a noise’ about
the issue. To infer that small groups with vested interest is insulting; this
case is actually supported by huge numbers of veterans. including the Royal Australian Regiment Association which represents the great
majority of RCB veterans, and an increasing number of former RAAF veterans are
becoming aware of the Government’s deception at the time, and now, the evidence
to hand that demonstrates that they actually were in danger. If anything, the
number of applications to date underscores the continued denial of those
veterans getting a fair hearing when they made it.
The true nature of the RCB
deployment was, as has already been stated, shrouded in secrecy. There is
evidence that not all RCB members were aware of the real nature of their
deployment.
Commanders had to follow
orders to maintain the deception of “training”. We also have evidence that the
true nature of affairs on the ground was kept from RAAF members because of the
possibility that families would seek repatriation to Australia. This could well
have caused political embarrassment to Australia in South East Asia and
provided a psychological advantage to the communists.
Most ADF members are not
aware of the conditions surrounding deployments and service classification and
rely on Defence to ‘do the right thing’.
RCB service
has been considered by several independent reviews, which have consistently
found it to be peacetime service.
Comment 35. We contend that much
of the evidence we now hold was, in all probability, not made available to
these previous independent reviews.
Our Defence and related
records relate to the 1970s. Until 2010, Australian Government records were
withheld from public access for 30 years, which means they were not necessarily
accessible to us until the last 10 years. Some are still embargoed. Without
access to these documents we have been handicapped in our ability to present
our case and consider it most likely that the ‘several independent reviews’
were not provided with all relevant evidence upon which to make a judgement
either.
This simply means that
their failure to agree our case is one of lack of hard evidence. This is now to
hand.
The 1994
Committee of Inquiry into Defence and Defence Related Awards concluded that:
Neither does the Committee consider that service at Butterworth was clearly and
markedly more demanding than normal peacetime service…
Despite
noting that service at Butterworth in Malaysia was one of the specific areas of
ADF service that the review was asked to advise on, the Review of service
entitlement anomalies in respect of South-East Asian service by Justice Mohr in
1999 made no recommendation of the reclassification of service at Butterworth.
Comment 36. Justice Mohr, in 2000,
found that ‘although there was still some danger abroad, this danger was remote
from activities at RAAF Butterworth’. Defence quote this line in order to
downplay the risk at Butterworth when evidence in documents referred to by them
show that the risk was in the Butterworth region. This fact, we believe,
supports our contention that Defence are selective and misleading in their
presentation of ‘facts’.
Given both the confirmed presence of terrorists in the near location of the
Base, the expectation at the time, and the briefings given to servicemen on the
ground, Mohr’s judgment of normal peacetime service at Butterworth would be
inconsistent with his statements on ‘objective danger’ if he had been made
aware of these facts.
We contend that relevant
facts were deliberately withheld. Why?, is the real issue. Evidence available
today to all parties would in all likelihood result in a different decision by
the 1994 Committee.
The 2003
Review of veterans' entitlements by a committee led by Justice Clarke stated
that training and protection of Australian assets are normal peacetime garrison
duties. The committee considered that peacetime service, whether rendered in
Australia or overseas, can be arduous and even hazardous. But these factors
alone do. But these factors alone do not warrant consideration of that duty as
operational or qualifying service for veterans under the Veterans' Entitlement
Act 1986.
The Clarke
committee concluded that no evidence was found that service at South-East Asia
currently established as peacetime service should be considered warlike. No
operational area was prescribed, no specific armed threat was present and there
were no rules of engagement to pursue specific military objectives.
Comment 37. We contend that the
evidence we have presented to the Minister and Defence, including that outlined
in this response, clearly refute the assertion that there was ‘no specific
armed threat … present and … no rules of engagement to pursue specific military
objectives’.
Surprisingly, Clarke found
that armed patrolling took place at Butterworth but stated that this was part
of normal peacetime service. Where is the evidence of this? Defence veterans
know that armed patrolling is not normal peacetime service. So does any
military member of NOSB, even the Minister himself who is an ex- Army officer.
The 2011
Inquiry into recognition for members of Rifle Company Butterworth for service
in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989, concluded by the Defence Honours and Awards
Appeals Tribunal, recommended that no change be made to the current medallic
entitlements, as there was no convincing evidence that the service of the RCB
was warlike.
Comment 38. Again, we contest this
finding.
Members of the RCB Review
Group in attendance at that hearing had no opportunity to present evidence that
supported their case. Nor was the evidence now to hand available at the time.
These tightly controlled
forums are not conducive to full objective assessment if the panellist do not
have a properly arbitrated process to consider all the evidence – they become
one sided contests where the unsupported appellants are likely to get
out-manoeuvred. That is neither fair nor naturally just.
A nature of
service review board in 2011 considered RCB service and found that it was
appropriately classified as peacetime service. The board—consisting of senior
executive service band 2 representatives in the Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet, Department of Veterans' Affairs, Department of Finance
and Department of Defence—was established to consider claims for the
reclassification of past service.
Comment 39. We contest this
finding.
We contend that the
evidence we have collected has not been evaluated by any independent review. In
fact, it cannot possibly have been given the mass we have accumulated in 2014
alone.
The final
report by Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group: Service in South-East Asia
1950-2011 in 2013, sponsored by the New Zealand government, stated that the
service of its rifle infantry company between those three years - which served similarly
to the RCB at Butterworth - was not operational service.
The New
Zealand JWG, joint working group, found that the communist terrorist activity
was of very slight significance to the New Zealand deployment to Butterworth
and did not characterise the tours in anyway.
Comment 40. We question the
relevance of New Zealand enquiries regarding this matter and are unable to
comment on the rules surrounding service recognition in that country. That
country did not commit a RCB under the conditions or for the reasons stated in
the Australian Defence Committee Minute 2/73.
I do not
that the petition contends that Defence, in assessing the claims, has not apply
consistent standards, been misleading with its facts, not considered key data
provided, denied natural justice, rewritten history in retrospect and based
decisions on budgetary constraints rather than recognising service at the
appropriate level.
Comment 41. We are forced to
conclude that the Minister cannot possibly have read our petition and supporting
plethora of new evidence, or he would not have stated this.
The evidence of written
interaction between us and the relevant Minister of the time shows that NOSB
has been severely wanting in the quality of their staff support to him.
Defence has
comprehensively examined and re-examined the available official documentation
to confirm the roles of the infantry rifle companies that rotated through
Butterworth and to assess the extent of exposure to the risk of harm.
Comment 42. We question the
integrity, competence and objectivity and currency
of Defence’s research.
Why, for example, have they continually failed
to address high level, secret documents showing training was a cover for the
real reason for the deployment and ignore evidence from Australia and Malaysia
showing the real nature of the SME?
We note, for example, this
quote from the NOSB April 2014 report prepared for the Committee.
The 1968-89 Insurgency
has been described as … a low-intensity campaign of subversion and
counter-subversion in Singapore and sporadic jungle skirmishes in Malaysia.
Aside from the fact that
such a statement in itself admits there WAS a SME when the repeated position as
that there was no such thing (see earlier statement by Minister), why did NOSB
not also reveal the fact that the article they have quoted from refers to ‘… a serious security threat that
required the combined efforts and resources of the Malaysia, Thai and Singapore
governments to resolve … sabotage and bombings against government installations
and personnel of both sides of the Causeway … [and] open bloody battles with
the Malaysian government …’?
The complete sentence
quoted above reads: ‘The
Second Emergency gradually developed into a low-intensity campaign of
subversion and counter-subversion in Singapore and sporadic jungle skirmishes
in Malaysia’.
Such gaffes
underscore poor research and glaring deficiencies in logic consistent with a
loss of direction as the truth becomes hard to refute.
Defence is
confident that all records and other evidence provided by claimants has also
been considered. No attempt has been made to conceal the fact that there was a
level of threat to RMAF Base Butterworth, but the levels assessed as low. The
daily routine of the air base continued unabated throughout the period. Service
personnel and their accompanying families had no restrictions on movements and
nearby Penang was a popular tourist destination.
Comment 43. We contend the
evidence shows this to be untrue.
At no stage has Defence
commented on all the evidence that we have presented that challenges their
assertions – evidence that has been referred to in this document.
2014 interchanges are
remarkable for their lack of currency of the data on the part of NOSB, and the
persistent holding of a particular line irrespective of the increasing and
overwhelming evidence.
I
acknowledge that the roles of the Rifle Company Butterworth were to provide a
ground-force presence in Malaysia to conduct training to assist in the security
of Butterworth if required and to provide a quick reaction force if required.
However, these roles in themselves do not constitute a warlike classification.
Comment 44. We contend that this
is indicative of grasping at straws.
We repeat the references
to the ample evidence including the Defence Committee Minute 2/73, all which
emanates from it including the ‘… ostensibly for training, flag-showing and a
change of scene.’ (Sir Arthur Tange, Secretary, Department of Defence, 2 March
1972.
Mr Robert:
It is a fact that RCB service does not meet the essential criteria for
classification as special overseas service or as warlike service, because
Australian forces were not engaged in any operations against hostile forces or
dissident elements after the end of confrontation on 11 August 1966. The
Defence review is consistent with several independent reviews that considered
RCB service, including the external New Zealand review.
Comment 45. We contend otherwise and believe the evidence supports our
case, hence the request to have our service reviewed.
I also note
that at no time throughout the period 1970 to 1989 did any Australian
government consider it appropriate to change the classification of any ADF
service at Butterworth from peacetime service.
Comment 46. As stated earlier, the
purpose is to have RCB’s service classification changed.
Objections to the statement
that the government have not considered it appropriate to change our service
classification, has been addressed above.
The decision
not to retrospectively reclassify RCB service is not based on budgetary
constraints. Whereas all matters presented to government, including those
dealing with past ADF service, must include consideration of any costs
associated with the proposal, the decision to maintain the peacetime
classification is based on the review of the nature of RCB service.
Comment 47. We certainly hope that
cost has not been a determining factor. Without discovery of documents we
cannot comment.
In
conclusion, the service of Rifle Company Butterworth has been reviewed
comprehensively by Defence and by several independent reviews, including a
review by New Zealand.
Reviews of
service have found consistently that this service does not meet the essential
criteria for reclassification as special overseas service or as warlike
service.
The role and
responsibilities of the RCB, and all evidence of the exposure to the risk of
harm, support the extant peacetime classification.
At no time
throughout the period 1970 to 1989 did any Australian government consider it
necessary or appropriate to reconsider or change the classification of RCB or
any other ADF service at RMAF Base Butterworth.
Comment 48. We believe we have
effectively rebutted the above claims and that the time has come to rectify
this injustice and to finally be honest with the Australian people about the
true nature of the RCB’s role in Malaysia during the SME.
Should somehow the
Government be unable to reach the fair decision alone then perhaps it will need
an independent arbiter with the historical analysis skills to conduct a hearing
that is binding.
I take this
opportunity to acknowledge the valuable contribution of all ADF service at
Butterworth, including that of the Rifle Company Butterworth. The peacetime
classification in no way denigrates the sometimes difficult and arduous nature
of these deployments.
Comment 48. We contend that this
is gratuitous, and believe that peacetime service recognition in no way is a
fair representation of RCB service at Butterworth.
It denies the true history
of RCB service and the SME that took the lives of 155 Malaysian Security Force
personnel. Until such time as proper recognition is granted the true value of
the RCB’s role can never be acknowledged and recorded.
Once again,
I am grateful for the opportunity to address you on this matter and am happy
for me or the Defence team to take any questions that the committee may have.
CHAIR: First, in response to this petition,
which states that no state of war emergency existed in Malaysia between 1970
and 1989, how would you characterise the activities of communist insurgents
from Sarawak or the official peace between the Malaysian government and
Malaysian communists?
Mr Robert: I will pass that to Colonel Thompson
(a) because he is the subject matter expert and (b) because he was a child
growing up there at the time.
Comment 49. We seriously question
the relevance and accuracy/validity of the recollection of childhood memories
from around 40 years ago.
We can, if asked, provide
recollections of many service personnel, both Army and RAAF, plus RAAF family
members who were there as adults, experienced the vagaries of that operational service
that differ to the recollections of a youth who is now Colonel Thompson.
Col. Thompson: There was a communist insurgency,
but it was extremely low level. It was actually along the border areas of what
is now Thailand, and certainly by the mid-seventies it would be characterised
as banditry more than a comprehensive insurgency.
Comment 50. This statement is
clearly refuted by evidence we have presented and reflects an embarrassing lack
of knowledge by a so-called expert as presented by the Minister.
There were
very limited attacks on any Malaysian constabulary, because it was a police
action.
Comment 51. An official history of the war published by
the Malaysian Army records a total of 1009 Malaysian Security Force casualties,
including 155 deaths. Both police and military were involved. We contend these
statistics do not support the statement ‘very limited attacks …’
Nor was it a police
action. This statement is simply wrong. Malaysia’s own official history must
not be denied; it was a long military-led campaign with over a thousand
soldiers killed and wounded, and numerous bravery decorations awarded.
The military
were not deployed against them—only very occasionally.
Comment 52. We contend that this
is completely wrong.
The Malaysian official
history lists, by chapter, what massive army expansion occurred, supported by
Air Force, Navy and Police to deal with the SME.
It is internationally
embarrassing if not insulting, to now say their Army was only occasionally
involved. Further, the NOSB document of April 2014 acknowledges DAFI’s view
that:
Continued use of the
[sic] Butterworth as a base for ground-attack against the CT can only increase
its attractiveness as a target … From this point of view, the threat to the Air
Base Butterworth must be considered to be slowly increasing.
This is clear reference to
a military, not police, action.
Further, the Malaysian
army, in their official history of the war, show the army was on operations
throughout the Malaysian Peninsular throughout the period of the war. One
history accessed by our Research Group showed that 20% of Malaysia’s 1976
budget was allocated to defence.
By 1989 it
had ended. The communist terrorist Chin Peng, who had been living the jungle,
was an old man and he finally came out and effectively ended the communist
insurgency.
Comment 53. We agree. In 1989,
what was considered at the time to be a serious insurgency threat came to an
end. Here, the inconsistency of the NOSB/Ministerial line is exposed – both the
SME and the fact it ended is actually stated.
CHAIR: Former RCB personnel have stated
that they and their families expected that combat would occur and that
casualties would be sustained and have argued that it is not relevant whether
actual combat occurred if there was an expectation that combat would occur. Is
that consistent with the practice during the period 1970 to 1989?
Col. Thompson: It is all a matter of perspective.
There were certainly no orders given and, although certain orders to Rifle
Company Butterworth may well have heightened the risk in their order of
training and raising people's awareness, I can tell you firsthand that the
everyday expectation, especially of families, was one of an idyllic and
peaceful lifestyle rather than any threat ever. I will pass to Ms Cooper, who
can categorise some of those.
Comment 54. We again question the
relevance of boyhood memories from around 40 years ago.
NOSB state in their April
report:
Defence also
contended that the likelihood of hostile action may well have been overstated
to the soldiers in order to ensure that training was as realistic as possible,
and that this may be the cause of the misconceptions about the role of the
infantry company and the hazards faced.
Compare this with the statement of Justice
Mohr in 2000:
On the assumption that we are dealing with rational people in a
disciplined armed service (i.e. both the person perceiving danger and those in
authority at the time), then if a serviceman is told there is an enemy and that
he will be in danger, then that member will not only perceive danger, but to
him or her it will be an objective danger on rational and reasonable grounds.
If called upon, the member will face that objective danger. The member's
experience of the objective danger at the time will not be removed by
'hindsight' showing that no actual enemy operations eventuated
If the troops were made to
believe they could face an enemy by their commanders, they, in fact, faced an
objective danger.
We further contend that
Colonel Thompson’s statement, and that of Defence, is irrational. The troops
were armed. They were ‘training’, so Defence would have us believe, on an
operational air force base in a foreign country, adjacent to the busy
north/south Highway between Butterworth and the Thai border. The Base was
surrounded by Malaysian civilians. Would a rational commander take the risk of
an accidental weapon discharge in such an environment by creating unnecessary
fear in the minds of the troops? Such a scenario could lead to an embarrassing
and unwanted diplomatic incident.
We have in our possession
a December 1978 document, recently discovered, authored by the then OC Rifle
Company at Butterworth including, among other things, recommended training
objectives for future deployments. He recommended that most objectives should
be attained before departure from Australia, but acknowledged some things could
not be done until the Company arrived on Base.
On base instruction and familiarisation
included ‘appreciation of the enemy threat and likely approaches’.
We also have a copy of
Standing Orders that cover the operation of the QRF, handling of ammunition,
Rules of Engagement and the like. Clearly, orders were in place, as would be
expected in any military operation.
Ms Cooper: The point the claimants are making
is the concept of perception of harm, which was discussed by Justice Moore when
he did his review. It has also been tested in the courts. Many people have
claimed they have warlike service, because they perceived danger and they all
felt danger; however, the conclusion from the courts was that there had to be a
real and objective danger, not just a perception of danger.
Comment 55. We contend, consistent
with Justice Mohr’s comments on ‘objective danger’, that we faced such a
danger. Evidence from the time shows that communist insurgents were active in
the area and that veterans were warned of such danger and prepared to meet it
if it realised.
Mr Robert: Chair, if you look through the
commanders’ diaries and look to the evidence of government and military at the
time, there was never an expectation of casualties occurring.
Comment 56. We refute this claim
and have presented ample evidence to support our claim. This has been outlined
above.
If I look at
my time as a military officer in 1998 in Bougainville during the crisis there,
we were unarmed - the first unarmed mission. It was seen as a peace-making
operation and while there was an Australian Service Medal issued, not an Active
Service Medal—no-one was claiming it was war-like, but it was quite common for
us to be confronted by weapons and knives and weapons in faces, there were
confronting issues in reconciliation and disarming rebels, but no-one was
claiming that Bougainville should be increased to war-like service.
Comment 56. We state that RCB’s
deployment was never a peace making operation.
We were not impartial,
neutral players. We were allied with Malaysia, sharing a base from which
military operations were being conducted against armed insurgents close by.
RCB members had an active
role in defending the Base against these insurgents using armed force.
The Minister’s comparison
is not relevant; the group he served with was an unarmed peace monitoring
entity. It is most unfortunate that he
chose to use it to devalue the RCB claim.
Mrs PRENTICE: So Bougainville was non-war-like?
Mr Robert: Absolutely. It is a peace-monitoring
group which comes under deployment allowance as opposed as opposed to
international campaign allowance. We faced consistent issues in danger,
engaging with hostile rebel groups, challenging banditry and theft across the
area and helicopters engaged by weapons fire. And that is a peace monitoring
arrangement.
Mr BUCHHOLZ: To your knowledge, have the
petitioners sought an audience with you or with the Department of Defence?
Mr Robert: I cannot remember offhand. It would
not surprise me if they had. Most claimants who want me to exercise ministerial
discretion on these issues always want to come to present their case. As a
general rule, I do not do it because we have established processes in
place - notwithstanding the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, the
professional body which seeks to explain that. It is a bit like me getting involved
in a court case which we would not do. Because we have DHAAT as a tribunal
which sits on these matters, I tend not to entertain discussion outside of -
Comment 57. We highlight an
embarrassing omission, the purpose of which is unclear.
We have in our possession
a letter dated 27 Sep 13, congratulating Minister Robert on his appointment to
his current position and reminding him of his promise (when in opposition) to
Ted Chitham and Stan Hannaford on 12 Nov 12 present in his Fadden Office to
review the decision of Minister Feeney to overturn the 2007 decision of
Minister Bilson to reclassify RCB service as non-warlike.
Following the release of
the April 2014 NOSB report approaches by Ken Marsh were made to Minister Robert
in an attempt to alert him to the possibility that the report was inaccurate
and had resulted in him inadvertently misleading the Parliament. It would seem
these approaches were ignored.
Mr BUCHHOLZ: Is there any way that the defence
force could see any light of this being reclassified? Is the evidence you have given us conclusive?
Mr Robert: Yes.
Comment 58. We contend otherwise
and believe the evidence supports our case.
Mr BUCHHOLZ: I am just asking for the Hansard
record, because I have no doubt our petitioners will troll through Hansard
looking to make sure that we have gone as hard as we can.
Mr Robert: That is a question the government
should answer. Based on all the available evidence we have, written and
otherwise, there is nothing that would at present indicate that the risk level
would move from low.
Comment 59. We contend this
statement proves the Minister is not aware of the legal underpinning of the
nature of service. As Justice Clarke said in 2003, attempts to add further
descriptors to ‘danger’ have only resulted in inconsistencies in service
recognition. All that is required is ‘that injury from hostile action was
conceivable and might reasonably have been regarded as an existing risk …’
We maintain the evidence
provided by Defence to the Committee demonstrate that injury from the action of
communist forces was both conceivable and a reasonable expectation at the time.
Evidence in our possession which has been presented to the Minister clearly shows injuries were
‘conceivable and might reasonably have been regarded as an existing risk’ at
the time.
CHAIR: Former RCB personnel have likened
their service to that undertaken by Defence Force personnel in East Timor
between 1999 and 2003. Is this a reasonable comparison? If not, how does the
service of RCB differ from that undertaken by Australians in East Timor?
Col. Thompson: I would say that the nature of
service was considerable. East Timor was an armed operation with an expectation
of casualties, with a real threat from the insurgents at the time. Combat
patrols were extensively taken and force protection measures—which you would
expect in a warlike circumstance—were undertaken. The Rifle Company
Butterworth—it would be difficult to draw any comparisons with what went on in
East Timor.
Comment 60. We understand that in
East Timor there were no battle casualties and that most troops had NO contact
with the enemy, even during aggressive patrolling.
We also understand that Army and RAAF personnel at Dili airfield had NO contact
with the enemy.
Compare this to
Butterworth where there were confirmed incidents involving Malaysian security
forces and insurgents adjacent to Butterworth Base and in excess of 1000
Malaysian battle casualties.
This indicates that if
Butterworth is seen within a ‘whole nation’ or ‘whole of conflict zone’,
context rather than an island remote from what was going on around it;
Butterworth was a significantly higher risk than East Timor.
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