Prepared in Support of the RCB Claim for Recognition of Service
Introduction
In
many ways Butterworth in the 1970s and 80s was an ideal posting. It
offered air force families in particular the chance of an overseas
posting with additional allowances and on the surface it appeared exotic
and peaceful. Because of strict press censorship and the desire of the
Malaysian Government not to unduly alarm the local populace or harm the
economy little was said about the existing and serious communist threat.
As the local population generally had little to fear from the
communists from 1951 on this decision seems well founded. It is perhaps
because of this decision that little has been written on the subject and
that nature of the insurgency and its impact on the country is not
generally understood.
As
this paper demonstrates, Australian personnel on strength at
Butterworth Air Base (BAB) during the period of the second communist
insurgency were exposed to ‘objective danger’ and as such their service
should be recognised as ‘war-like’.
The Threat
The second insurgency commenced on 17 June 1968 when ‘the MCP[1] launched an ambush against the Security Forces in the area of Kroh–Bentong in the northern part of [sic]Malaysian Peninsular. They achieved a major success, killing 17 members of Security Forces[2].’
Kroh-Bentong is less than 80 kilometres in a straight line from
Butterworth. In the lead up to the second insurgency the communists had
‘developed new techniques of guerrilla warfare and learned much from the
Vietnam War on the techniques of fighting guerrilla warfare’[3].
The
modus operandi of guerrillas is hit and run attacks by small groups
against much larger military forces. Tactics involve sabotage, ambush,
raids and petty warfare. The elements of surprise and ‘extraordinary
mobility’ are used to harass the enemy[4].
Following the communist split in the early 1970s (see below) Chin
Peng’s group ‘sent out “Shock Brigades” – small units which moved south
down the peninsula not only to pick off isolated police posts and
Security Forces, jungle patrols but also through propaganda to rekindle
support for the M.C.P.’ from, their base on the Thai-Malaysian border.[5]
A
1973 report prepared by the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency
describes a careful and methodical re-establishment of a very competent
communist guerrilla force in North West Malaysia.
By
mid-1968, some 600 armed Communist insurgents … began to move gradually
from inactive to active status under stimulation from Peking. They
moved back across the border [from Thailand], first to reconnoitre and
then permanently to position themselves in small base areas in northern
West Malaysia. The CTs - - that is, Communist Terrorists or members of
the MNLA[6]
– numbered about 600 regular armed cadres at the close of the Emergency
(1948-1960), expanded to about 1,000 by 1968, to about 1,600 in
mid-1970, and to about 1,800 in mid-1972. The slow upward progression in
the number of armed insurgents represents a positive gain, and the
existence of small bases capable of accommodating about 40-60 CTs points
toward a long-term potential expansion.’[7]
The
Peking-inspired revival of the armed insurgency can be fixed to the
date of 17 June 1968 when a force of the MNLA for the first time since
the late 1950s attacked a Malaysian security force unit on Malaysian
territory. This well-trained Communist force numbered about 40 armed and
uniformed men, and their ambush was effectively carried out. The
evidence is that the revival of the insurgency in mid-1968 reflected
from the start considerable military competence: good planning, tactical caution, good execution.
CT units were armed and given uniforms in Southern Thailand and were
infiltrated skilfully into Malaysian territory with the initial mission
of reconnoitring and re-establishing contacts with underground
insurgents. Their mission later became that of making selective attacks
on Malaysian security force units and undertaking selective sabotage of
key installations in West Malaysia. Toward the end of 1968, the number
of NMLA – or CT – incursions from southern Thailand gradually increased.
In late 1970, it was solidly confirmed that small groups of CT infiltrators had permanently established small bases
for inside-Malaysia operations – a development occurring for the first
time since the late 1950s. Later, the base camps were reported to be
capable of supporting 40-60 CTs, as they included food caches.
The
CTs were still building their units and were not in a phase of general
offensive operations. But they did engage in selective strikes against
government forces. A major incident involving the mining by CT forces of
the main west coast road linking Malaysia and Thailand took place in
late October 1969. On 10 December, a strategic installation was hit: a
group of CTs blew up the 100-foot-long railway bridge on Malaysian
territory about two miles southwest of Padang Besar, Perlis Province,
severing for a few days the main railway link between Thailand and
Malaysia. Gradually the CTs increased the number of cross-border
incursions, their calculation having been to demonstrate their ability
to operate on Malaysian territory without suffering extensive combat
losses. They
wanted to test their own ability to safely infiltrate, to hit important
installations and roads, and to move bigger units across undetected.
Their planning was careful, the pace deliberate, and the actions
generally low risk [emphasis added].’ [8]
According
to Ong Wei Chong by ‘1971 … guerrilla strength had grown to an
estimated 1,200 with another 3,000 cadres in the villages. By 1971, the
Malayan Communists had infiltrated their former village-bases in
Kelantan, Kedah and Perak and were operating along the same lines as
they had done in the 1950s[9].
Penang’s Province Wellesley (now Seberang Perai), in which BAB is
located, shares its northern and eastern borders with Kedah and its
southern border with Perak. Kedah is identified as an area where the
communists were most active[10],
while Perak is described as being an ‘important and vital … bastion’ in
the war against the communists during the second insurgency[11].
The
communist’s 8th Assault Unit with ‘a strength of between 60 and 70 CTs’
was active in South Kedah, including the area around Kulim, until
forced to withdraw by Malaysian security forces in 1978[12]. Kulim is less than 30 kilometres by road from Butterworth.
By October 1974 the MCP leadership had split into three different factions following internal conflicts going back to early 1970[13]. Cheah Boon Keng says that consequently ‘each faction tried to outdo the other in militancy and violence’[14].
Penang Attacked During ‘New Emergency
Writing for the journal Pacific Affairs summer edition of 1977 Richard Stubbs says:
In
September 1975 the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Razak, described the
recent resurgence of communist guerrilla activity in Peninsula Malaysia
as the “New Emergency”. By making the comparison [to the 48-60
Emergency], the Prime Minister clearly signalled the seriousness with
which the Malaysian Government viewed the renewal of the communist
threat … Not only had there been a number of spectacular terrorist
attacks – the bombing of the capital’s War Memorial; the assassination
of Perak’s Chief of Police; and the grenade and rocket attacks on the
Police Field Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur military air base and several
camps in Johore, Port Dickson and Penang – but also, and perhaps more
ominously, there had been a steady increase in the preceding three years
in the number of police and security force personnel killed and
injured. Moreover, the communists seem to have been able to attract
recruits and solicit at least some support throughout the peninsula.[15]
Communist Successes
Major Nazar Bin Talib writes:
At
the initial stage of their second insurgency, the MCP achieved a
significant amount of success. Their actions at this stage were more
bold and aggressive and caused considerable losses to the Security
Forces. These successes were due to their preparation and the training
that they received during the “lull periods” or the reconsolidation
period after the end of the first insurgency. By this time, they also
had significant numbers of new members, who were young and very
aggressive. They had learned from the past that they could no longer
rely on sympathizers from the poor or village people for their food and
logistics[16].
1971
- Major
B. Selleck, the OC of the first RCB deployment to Butterworth, reported
that on his second tour of Butterworth in June 71: ‘The CT threat was
more serious on this occasion, with training activity limited to the
Base and Penang. The CTs were very active, blowing up a bridge five
miles North of the Base, and daily skirmishes with the local military
and police forces’[17].
1974
- A communist mortar attack destroyed a Caribou aircraft at Sungai Besi RMAF airbase on 31 March 1974[18].
- Malaysia’s
third Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Abdul Rahman Hashim was
assassinated on 7 June 1974 by communists on Mountbatten Road (now Jalan
Tun Perak), in the centre of Kuala Lumpur, on the order of Chin Peng[19].
- On
October 1974 the Marxist-Leninist Faction ‘proclaimed its existence by
displaying banners and anonymously distributing leaflets throughout
Peninsula Malaysia … numerous terrorist incidents in major urban areas
were attributed to its Faction, and their efforts certainly troubled the
Government.[20]
1975
- Malaysia’s National Monument in Kuala Lumpur was damaged by an explosion set by CTs[21].
- Perak’s chief police officer was murdered by CTs. Subsequently 3 attempts were made on the life of his successor[22].
1987
- Two
of the factions from the earlier split surrendered to Thai troops in
December. Following the surrender ‘it was reported that only 1300
guerrillas of the original CPM’s 8th, 10th and 12th Regiments remained
active. Peace finally came on 2 December 1989[23]
Malaysian Government Response
In
response to Communist inspired fatal race riots in Kuala Lumpur in May
1969 the ‘Government acted promptly … by reintroducing counterinsurgency
measures that proved effective during the Emergency years [1948 –
1960]… To guarantee internal security the government maximised the
employment of police and provided additional powers to the military to
conduct police operations by revisiting the Internal Security Act of
1960’[24]. According
to Stubbs they ‘gradually reintroduced counter-guerrilla measures that
proved effective during the Emergency years.’ These included ‘short-term
curfews … and food-denial programmes’ in those areas thought to be
targeted by CTs[25].
Major Nazar Bin Talib provides commentary on the Government’s response to the emergency:
The
… Government … introduced a new strategy of fighting the MCP. It was
known as Security and Development, or KESBAN, the local acronym, and
focused on civil military affairs. KESBAN constituted the sum total of
all measures undertaken by the Malaysian Armed Forces and other
(government) agencies to strengthen and protect society from subversion,
lawlessness, and insurgency which effectively broke the resistance…
The
government also instituted other security measures in order to meet the
MCP menace, including strict press censorship, increasing the size of
the police force, resettling squatters and relocating villages in
“insecure” rural areas. By mid 1975, when the MCP [Malayan Communist
Party] militant activities were at a peak, the government promulgated a
set of Essential Regulations, without declaring a state of emergency.
The Essential Regulations provided for the establishment of a scheme
called a ‘Rukun Tetangga,’50 ‘Rela’ (People’s Volunteer Group). The
concept of “Rukun Tetangga” (Neighborhood Watch) had made the Malays,
Chinese, and Indians become closer together, and more tolerant of each
other. [26]’
The
Government decided against ‘declaring a state of emergency during the
second insurgency. The reason was a desire to avoid the fears of the
populace (leading to increase in ethnic antipathy) and to avoid scaring
away needed foreign investment.’[27]
Crisis in the Malaysian Government
While
the government responded to the emergency effectively, as demonstrated
by its final victory, the Communists unsettled the government. According
to one of Malaysia’s leading historians[28], Cheah Boon Kheng:
The
communist threat was so serious during the administration of the third
Prime Minster Hussein Onn (1976-81) that it was alleged the government
had been infiltrated and there was communist influence among UMNO
politicians. These allegations arose in the heat of UMNO politics during
the party’s annual elections for top posts, and were taken so seriously
that two UMNO deputy ministers and several Malay journalists were
detained for communist activities[29].
According to Stubbs, ‘Abdul Samad Ismail (former managing editor of the New Straights Times)
had communist affiliations and there were suspicions around Government
members, ‘particulalry Abdullah Ahmed and Abdulla Majid, close
associates of the late Prime Minister, Tun Razak’.[30]
Contrast to 48 - 60
In June 1948 the murder of three planters in the state of Kedah marked the start of the Malayan Emergency, or first insurgency[31].
From the start the communists looked to the local population for
support with food and money and coerced cooperation with acts of murder
and violence[32].
By 1951 Chin Peng had recognised that terrorism against the civilian
population had backfired and gave a directive that there be no more
attacks on civilians or the infrastructure on which they relied for
their livelihood and well-being[33].
General Sir Harold Briggs arrived in Malaya in 1951 and shortly thereafter developed and implemented the ‘Briggs Plan’[34].
This ‘brought about a serious food crisis for the insurgents because it
isolated them from their food suppliers – the Chinese squatters living
on the jungle fringes who were forcibly removed by the government and
transferred to fenced-in ‘new villages’ that came under government
control’[35]. This, along with other military initiatives, saw the guerrillas driven ‘‘deeper and deeper into the jungle’[36].
In
the spring of 1953 Chin Peng, the communist leader, fled Malaya to
direct operations from Thailand. This had a devastating impact on the
morale of the CTs. To quote Barber, ‘it seems that in many ways the
heart had gone out of ‘the cause’’[37].
Before
the end of 1953 General Sir Gerald Templer, British High Commissioner
to Malaya, expressed the view that the ‘military war’s nearly over’ and
that only ‘the political one remains …’[38]
It was in this year that Malacca was declared the country’s first
‘white area’. A white area was one considered ‘out of the war’. All
restrictions such as curfews, rationing and police checks were lifted.
By 1955, 14,000 square miles of Malaya had been declared ‘white’. Almost
half the country was ‘white’ by the end of 1956[39] and the communists had been reduced to 3,000 fighting personnel[40].
By the time the Second Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment arrived in Penang in 1955 it was a white area[41].
After 1955 ‘when it was evident that the communists were on the run and
the government had gained the upper hand’, Penang was a popular ‘rest
and relaxation centre’ for many Commonwealth troops and support
personnel’, many of whom drove from Kuala Lumpur while others caught the
overnight train[42].
At
the time the RAAF received ownership of BAB in 1957 the Australian
government decided to base three operational units there, which meant
providing accommodation for the families of RAAF members. This despite
Malaya being ‘an ‘operational’ zone, albeit a fairly benign one …[43].
RAAF
School Penang was established in 1958. ‘Prior to 1958, the Australian
commitment at Butterworth was the Airfield Construction Unit. The few
primary school-aged dependants of these men attended either the RAF
School at Butterworth (which closed when the RAF returned to England in
1960) or the British Army Children's School at Georgetown, Penang.
Secondary pupils attended either the British Secondary School at Cameron
Highlands or at Singapore.’[44]
It
is worth noting the difference between the above circumstances and
those at Johore which remained one of the few ‘black’ areas in 1955. The
area was considered too dangerous for army wives and they remained in
Singapore, but would occasionally be invited to spend a weekend in
Kluang if the police could guarantee the safety of the houses in which
they would stay[45].
By September 57 only 1,360 CTs remained in Malaya, with another 470 over the border in Thailand[46]. This had reduced to 250 active CTS in the country by the end of 1958[47].
While
it seems the number of active terrorists during the first insurgency
were significantly more in the early years history shows they were
effectively defeated early on, with Chin Peng fleeing the country in
1953. The picture painted by Noel Barber in ‘The War of the Running
Dogs’ and other sources is of an demoralised enemy being forced further
and further into the jungle where they were hunted down by the security
forces. From 1953 on more and more areas were declared ‘white’, meaning
they were effectively ‘out of the war’.
By
the middle of 1970 there were around 1,600 well trained, bold,
aggressive and competent CTs active in Malaysia supported by a greater
number of cadres. The CIA estimated that by 1972 this number had risen
to around 1800. Richard Stubbs, in his 1977 paper, estimates the number
of guerrillas at around 2,600 with Ching Peng’s group being around 2000.
It is further estimated that there were approximately 15,000 supporting
cadres in Peninsula Malaysia.[48]
From the start of the insurgency they targeted security forces,
including military establishments, and public infrastructure with their
activities peaking in 1975.They successfully conducted terrorist
activities from the Thai border in the north to Johore in the south and
penetrated areas that had been declared white – and therefore out of the
war – since the mid-1950s.
These
forces had learned to operate without reliance on the support of the
local population – a factor that had contributed to their defeat during
the Emergency. Following the surrender of two factions in 1987 around
1300 guerrillas remained active. For almost 20 years they had maintained
numbers at a higher level than at any time since the end of 1957 and
were not contained in the jungles as they had been for much of the first
insurgency.
Butterworth Air Base
Seberang
Perai (Province Wellesley) where BAB is located , has an area of
approximately 700 square kilometres on the mainland of North West
Malaysia. As stated above it shares its northern and eastern borders
with Kedah and its southern border part with Kedah and the remainder
with Perak. The communists, as noted above, were active in both these
states during the second insurgency.
It
was against the background described above of growing communist
activity in the states immediately surrounding BAB that a 1971
intelligence assessment of the threat to the Base to the end of 1972
considered it ‘possible, but still unlikely, that the CPM/CTO could take
a decision to attack the Base …’ However, it also concluded that; ‘There is definitely a risk that
one or more CTs or members of subversive groups could regardless of
CPM/CPO policy and / or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time’ [emphasis added]. It was believed these ‘isolated’ attacks could occur at ‘any time’ without advanced warning.
Anticipated methods of attack included penetration of the base at night
by one or more (up to 20) CTs, sabotage, booby traps, small arms fire
or mortar attacks ‘if the CTs acquired this capability …’[49]
Clearly, the CTs were using mortars in early 1974 (see above). It must
be noted that communist activities continued to escalate after the date
of this assessment and that following the split in the early 70s ‘each
faction tried to outdo the other in militancy and violence’[50]
Against
this background it seems highly unlikely that an Australian military
commander would do anything less than take all necessary precautions
appropriate to the assessed level of risk to defend Australian assets
and personnel. Documents cited in the Rifle Company Butterworth’s
submission clearly indicate an increased concern regarding base security
and this is supported by the testimony of members of the Company.
Confirmation of the existence of Australian intelligence reports
indicating several incidents involving CT and Australian troops is
contained in an email sent by a Mr Allan Hawke of the Department of
Defence to Mr C. J. Duffield[51]
Armed patrolling and rules of engagement authorising lethal force can
only mean one thing – these men were on a combat footing. Any other
conclusion denies the evidence.
In the February 2000 Review of Service Entitlement Anomalies in Respect of South-East Asian Service 1955-1975[52] Justice Mohr addressed the matter of ‘objective danger’. Mohr stated:
To
establish whether or not an ‘objective danger’ existed at any given
time, it is necessary to examine the facts as they existed at the time
the danger was faced. Sometimes this will be a relatively simple
question of fact. For example, where an armed enemy will be clearly
proved to have been present. However, the matter cannot rest there.
On
the assumption that we are dealing with rational people in a
disciplined armed service (ie. both the person perceiving the danger and
those in authority at the time), then if a serviceman is told there is
an enemy and he will be in danger, then that member will not only
perceive danger, but to him or her it will an objective danger on
rational and reasonable grounds. If called upon, the member will face
that objective danger. The member’s experience of the objective danger
at the time will not be removed by ‘hindsight’ showing that no actual
enemy operations eventuated.
…
It seems to me that proving that a danger has been incurred is a matter
to be undertaken irrespective of whether or not the danger is perceived
at the time of the incident under consideration. The question must
always be, did an objective danger exist? That question must be
determined as an objective fact, existing at the relevant time, bearing
in mind both the real state of affairs on the ground, and on the
warnings given by those in authority when the task was assigned to the
persons involved.
Clearly,
in relation to service at BAB, an armed enemy clearly existed. There
was an ‘objective danger’. Additionally, evidenced tendered by members
of the RCB, ‘rational people in a disciplined armed service’, were ‘told
there is an enemy’ and that they were ‘in danger’. According to the
precedent established by Mohr, this ‘objective danger’ cannot ‘be
removed by ‘hindsight’ showing that no actual enemy operations
eventuated’.
Mohr had earlier stated:
I
am fully conscious of the provisions governing the award of medals,
qualifying service, etc, in Warrants, Acts and guidelines, The point is
however, that so many members of the ADF served in South-East Asia
during the period of the Review had no idea of the necessity for
themselves or their unit to have been ‘allotted’ before they received
qualification for a medal or repatriation benefits and now find
themselves disadvantaged years later because those who ordered them to
do their duty, which they did, took no steps to ensure the required
allotment procedures were attended to when quite clearly they should
have been.
There is a procedure available for retrospective allotment but this appears not to have been followed in many cases.
It
seems unfair that members of the ADF in this situation should be denied
the opportunity to put forward for consideration the nature of their
service, which would in many cases, amount to operational and/or
qualifying service because of this action, or rather lack of action, of
their superiors.[53]
This statement has relevance for the RCB claim.
Reasons for Denying Active Service Classification
Three
documents are referred to that provide reasons for rejection of the
claim for recognition of ‘war-like service’ at BAB in the period
1970-89:
- A letter from the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Lieutenant General D.J. Hurley, AC, DSC Inquiry into the Recognition of Members of Rifle Company Butterworth for Service in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989, 23rd June 2010, file reference VCDF/out/2010/492;
- 2011 Nature of Service Branch Review ADF Service at RAAF Butterworth 1970-1989, Nature of Service Branch, 14 October 2011; and
- Background Information Paper Nature of Service Classification – ADF Service at RAAF Butterworth, Nature of Service Branch, 14 Oct 2011,
Lieutenant General Hurley’s letter, in paragraphs 8 and 9, cites the March 1994 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Defence and Defence Related Awards,
that considered ‘service at Butterworth was clearly or markedly no more
demanding that normal peace time service …’ The reason for this
conclusion is no doubt the comment cited in paragraph 8, ‘Some of these
submissions argued that a low level communist threat continued to exist until … 1989’ (emphasis added).
This
‘low level communist threat’ took 21 years to defeat, compared to the
12 taken to defeat the first insurgency. The communists maintained their
numbers throughout the duration of that 21 years at levels in excess of
those that had existed in the Malay Peninsula from the end of 1957
(more than two years prior to the end of the first Emergency) and their
success in being able to effectively strike at targets in urban areas
stands in stark contrast to the 1953 statement of General Sir Gerald
Templer that the ‘military war’s nearly over’. This was clearly a
dangerous threat that the Malaysian Government considered serious. It
was, in the words of the former Prime Minister Tun Razak, the ‘New
Emergency’.
While
the second document cites a number of documents purported to support
the above conclusion those cited by the RCB that clearly indicate real
concerns regarding security at the base are not addressed. This evidence
should not be discounted.
Paragraph
30 of the second document states that the Ground Defence Operations
Centre ‘was never activated due to a shared defence emergency’ and
therefore retrospectively concludes that ‘service at Butterworth must
have remained as peacetime service subsequent to 8 Sep 1971’. This
statement violates the precedent established by Mohr above.
Reference
is also made in paragraphs 32 to 36 to the civilian and domestic
environment in the Butterworth region. Evidence provided above shows
that much of the Malay Peninsula had been declared white by 1955,
including Penang which was a popular recreation area for troops serving
in Malaya at the time. The author remembers armed police and military
roadblocks in Butterworth on more than one occasion during the period
July 1977 to January 1980. These would not have been in place in White
Areas during the first insurgency.
At
paragraph 52 the writer says that the Governor-General cannot make a
declaration in regards to the nature of service without prior
determination by the Government and a declaration by the relevant
Minister. Paragraph 53 then states:
The
Minister will only act after firstly considering the informed advice of
the CDF, and secondly having obtained the agreement of the Prime
Minster. The briefing provided by the CDF would be expected to take into
account the impact of collateral financial benefits costed by the
Department of Defence, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and the
Department of Finance and Deregulation, and any views expressed by these
agencies.
The document Background Information Paper Nature of Service Classification – ADF Service at RAAF Butterworth,
at paragraphs 73 and 80 make reference to cost, with paragraph 80
stating: ‘The cost of including this service in the DVA budget is
assessed as significant.’
Compare this with the following enunciated in Principle 10 of the March 1994 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Defence Awards (CIDA).
Matters
relating to honours and awards should be considered on their merits in
accordance with these principles, and these considerations should not be
influenced by the possible impact, real or perceived, on veterans’
entitlements.
It
would appear reference to ‘significant’ costs in the above mentioned
document was designed to influence the decision of the Minster and the
Prime Minister in violation of this principle.
In
a letter to Mr Robert Cross, dated 19 May 2012, Senator the Hon David
Feeney, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, states on page 3:
For
any ADF service at Butterworth from 1970 onwards to meet the original
intent of hazardous service, the service would need to be shown to be
“substantially more dangerous than normal peace time service” and
“attract a similar degree of physical danger” as “peacekeeping service”.
Peacekeeping service generally involves interposing the peacekeeping
force, which may be unarmed, between opposing hostile forces. The
immediate threat to peacekeepers is by being directly targeted or by
being caught in the crossfire of the opposing forces.
Senator
Feeney correctly points out that service at Butterworth was not
peacekeeping service. ADF personnel were not interposed ‘between
opposing hostile forces’. Rather, they shared the facility at BAB with
members of the Malaysian Security Forces who were prosecuting a war
against a competent and deadly enemy who during the second insurgency
successfully attacked military and police targets, including the air
base at Kuala Lumpur. Regardless of any security action taken or not
taken by Australian Defence Authorities members of the ADF were opposed
to an ‘objective danger’ as discussed by Mohr above, whether they were
being ‘immediately targeted or by being caught in the crossfire of the
opposing forces’. This danger existed ‘irrespective of whether or not
the danger … [was] perceived at the time’ by Australian Forces.
The
Minister also notes on page 4 that the ‘Clarke Report accepted that RCB
was involved in armed patrolling to protect Australian assets, but
concluded that training and the protection of Australian assets were
normal peacetime duties.’ The author of this paper has had 20 years
military experience, including guard duty at Williamtown and Richmond
air force bases. While service rifles were carried on after hours
patrolling no ammunition was available and there were no rules of
engagement. Further, the author is unaware of sentries at the entrance
to any defence establishment in Australia carrying weapons – with or
without ammunition. In the author’s five years of service at Butterworth
sentries always carried weapons. The Clarke statement does not ring
true.
Any
fair assessment of the facts can only conclude that Australian
personnel at Butterworth during the second insurgency were serving in
conditions that meet the criteria for ‘war-like service’. The risk to
those personnel serving within the confines of BAB was significantly
higher than those who served in the same location from at least the
mid-1950s to the end of the 1948 – 1960 Emergency who were granted
qualifying service for repatriation benefits as a consequence of that
service.
Principle
3 of the CIDA principles states: ‘To maintain the inherent fairness and
integrity of the Australian system of honours and awards care must be
taken that, in recognising service by some, the comparable service of
others is not overlooked or degraded’. This ‘inherent fairness and
integrity’ will remain compromised until ADF members serving at BAB
during the second communist insurgency are recognised as having
participated in ‘war-like service’.
[1] MCP – Malaysian Communist Party
[2] Nazar Bin Talib, Major, Malaysian Army, Malaysia’s Experience in War Against Communist Insurgency And Its Relevance To The Present Situation In Iraq,
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
master of military studies, AY 2004-05, United States Marine Corps,
Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development, Marine Corps
University, at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA505882, accessed 12 Sep 2012, p.17
[3] Ibid.
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_warfare
[5] Richard Stubbs, Peninsular Malaysia: The “New Emergency”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer, 1977), University of Brittish Columbia, p.251, accessed at http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2756301?uid=3737536&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21101243992931, 6 Oct 2012
[6] MNLA – Malayan National Liberation Army
[7] Directorate
of Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency, USA (CIA)), Intelligence
Report: Peking’s Support of Insurgencies In Southeast Asia (Reference
Title: POLO LIII), April 1973, p.p. 115, 116, at http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-37.pdf, accessed 12 Sep 2012
[8] Ibid, p.p. 117, 118
[9] Ong Wei Chong, Voice
of the Malayan Revolution: The Communist Party of Malaya’s Struggle for
Hearts and Minds in the ‘Second Malayan Emergency’ (1969-1975), Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 13 October 2006, p.19, at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP116.pdf, accessed 12 Sep 2012
[10] Ibid, p.26
[11] Ipoh World: Saving Yesterday for Tomorrow, at http://www.ipohworld.org/search8/result.asp?strid=2889, accessed 12 Sept 2012
[12] Ian Ward, Chin Peng, My Side of History, Media Masters, Singapore, 2003, p.41.
[13] Op.cit., Nazar Bin Talib, p.18
[14] Cheah Boon Kheng, The communist insurgency in Malaysia, 1948-90: contesting the nation-state and social change, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 11, 1 (June 2009), p.149, at http://www.nzasia.org.nz/downloads/NZJAS-June09/14_Cheah_3.pdf, accessed 12 Sep 2012
[15] Richard Stubbs, Peninsular Malaysia: The “New Emergency”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer, 1977), University of Brittish Columbia, p.249.
[16] Op.cit, Nazar Bin Talib, , p.17
[17] A.H. Maple, Lt Col, A History of the Deployment of an Australian Rifle Company to Butterworth, at Annex B: AHU:03-092, file 755-1-20 dated 12th December 2003, cited in RCB Review Group, Submission: Review of Australian Army Rifle Company’s Military Service as Warlike 1970-1989 Butterworth (RCB), undated, p.10
[18] Military Analysis: PASKAU, at http://militaryanalysis.blogspot.com.au/2010/10/paskau.html, accessed 12 Sep 2012.
RCB Review Group, Submission: Review of Australian Army Rifle Company’s Military Service as Warlike 1970-1989 Butterworth (RCB), undated, p.5.
[19] Malaysian Institute of Geomancy Sciences, www.mingsweb.org/kv_art22.asp, accessed 8 Sept 2012
The Star on Line at http://thestar.com.my/lifestyle/story.asp?file=/2009/11/29/lifefocus/20091128170722&sec=lifefocus, accessed 8 Sept 2012
[20] Op.cit, Richard Stubbs, p.251
[21] Tugu Negara (National Monument), Kuala Lumpur, at http://www.asiaexplorers.com/malaysia/tugu_negara_national_monument.htm, accessed 12 Sep 2012
[22] Op.cit, Ipoh World
[23] Op.cit,Cheah, p.150
[24] Mohd Zakaria Yadi, Malaysian Emergencies – Anthropological Factors in the Success of Malaysia’s Counter Insurgency, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004, accessed at http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/1295/04Dec_Yadi.pdf?sequence=1, 1 October 2012.
[25] Op. cit, Stubbs, p.259
[26] Op.cit , Nazar Bin Talib, p. p.19-21
[27] Ibid.
[28] National University of Singapore, at http://www.nus.edu.sg/nuspress/subjects/history/978-9971-69-274-2.html, accessed 12 Sep 2012
[29] Op.cit,Cheah, p.149
[30] Op.cit, Stubbs, p.259
[31] History of the Australia – Malaysia Defence Relationship, at http://www.malaysia.embassy.gov.au/files/klpr/History%20of%20the%20Australia-Malaysia%20Defence%20Relationship.pdf, accessed 30 September 2012.
[32] Noel Barber, The war of the running dogs – How Malaya defeated the communist guerrillas 1948 – 1960, William Collins, 1971, 2004 Paperback Edition by Cassell, early chapters.
[33] Ibid, Barber, p.p. 159, 160
[34] Wikipedia, Brigg’s Plan, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Briggs%27_Plan, accessed 13 Sep 2012.
Op.cit, Barber, p.116
[35] Op.cit, Cheah, p.141
[36] Ipoh World, General Sir Gerald Templer GCMG KCB KBE DSO High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya, at http://www.ipohworld.org/search8/result.asp?strid=2841, accessed 12 Sep 2012.
[37] Op.cit, Barber, p.230
[38] Ibid, p.232
[39] Ibid, p.p. 234, 279, 302.
[40] Britain’s Small Wars, The Communist Defeat in Malaya, at http://www.britains-smallwars.com/malaya/def.html, accessed 10 Sep 2012.
[41] Biography of R.G.E. Betts, at http://www.justinmuseum.com/famjustin/Bettsbio.html, accessed 10 Sept 2012
[42] MM2H Malaysia My Second Home Forum, at http://www.my2home.info/index.php?topic=1436.0, accessed 10 Sep 2012.
[43] Radschool Association Magazine – Vol 38, at http://www.radschool.org.au/magazines/Vol38/Page10.htm, accessed 8 Sept 2012.
RAAF School Penang Official Website, http://www.raafschoolpenang.com/photopages/raaf.htm, accessed 8 Sept 2012.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Op.cit, Barber p.286
[46] Ibid, p.305
[47] Ibid, p.319
http://www.myfareast.org/Malaysia/emergency.html, accessed 10 Sep 2012
[48] Op. cit, Stubbs, p.251. For details of estimated numbers see footnote #4.
[49] Document: ANZUK Intelligence Groups 1/1971 – The Threat to Air Base Butterworth up to the End of 1972, dated 30th November 1971, cited by RCB Review Group, p.p. 17,18
[50] Op.cit, Cheah, p.149
[51] Email, Hawke, Allan SECRETARY Allan.Hawke@cbr.defence.gov.ay, sent Monday, 4 September 2000 9:46 AM.
[52] Mohr, Review of Service Entitlement Anomalies in Respect of South-East Asian Service 1955-1975, Feb 2000, p.9
[53] Ibid, p.p. 7,8
